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Thanks a lot for the invitation to Trier and for your nice words of 
welcome to this talk about certain aspects of ordinary judges as 
constitutional judges. I will pay particular attention to Norway, 
but within the framework of a more general approach. 
The lecture makes part of a series on “Rechtsstaatsprinzip 
versus Demokratie”. Both words refer to complex notions to 
which we adhere without necessarily agreeing about any 
possible aspect. At this occasion, I have no ambition to 
contribute substantially to the discussion on any of them. At the 
same time, I believe that they may provide useful lighthouses 
on our way to more particular issues and hope that you will find 
some traces of that if what follows. 
In this series, you have heard a lecture about Greece, a country 
with no separate constitutional court, but with a specialised 
institution at the crossroads between the two “ordinary” 
supreme judicial instances. Other speakers have presented the 
full-fledged specialised constitutional courts of the Czech 
Republic and Spain. The last few years, the Spanish one has 
been particularly visible regarding its role on the way to the 
ongoing Catalonian crisis. 
In Norway, there is a single-tired judicial system with a single 
supreme instance on its top and no constitutional court. The 
Supreme Court of Norway serves as the final instance in all 
fields of law. Insofar as a case gives raise to questions where 
norms of a constitutional rank are part of the arsenal needed for 
providing an answer, its powers include matters related to 
constitutional law. In such cases, its members act as 
constitutional judges. As we shall see, however, this does not 
make the Supreme Court itself a “constitutional court”. 
The absence of a specialised constitutional court is common for 
the Scandinavian countries. For Sweden (and Finland), with 
two-tired judicial systems, this holds true even if a single final 
instance might be needed in cases where the two supreme 
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courts come to irreconcilable conclusions in matters of 
constitutional interest. Interestingly enough, however, no such 
situation has yet surfaced in practice. 
In Norway, Denmark and Iceland, the presence of just one 
Supreme Court makes the situation in this respect somewhat 
simpler. 
As a contribution to understanding why the absence of separate 
constitutional courts is not generally considered a problem, the 
distinction between a “Rechtsstaat” and a “Gesetzstaat” may 
prove useful. As Norway is a unitary state, we leave the 
complexities raising from federal systems of law aside. 
In a hierarchal system of legal norms, you have the constitution 
on top (or at the basis, as rightly suggested by the word 
“Grundgesetz”, in Scandinavian: “grunnlov”). One of the 
characteristics of a genuine “Rechtsstaat” would be that the 
constitution counts as positive law in the sense of being 
applicable even by judges. 
Simplifying a bit, the next level in the hierarchy consists of 
ordinary statutes. In a pure “Gesetzstaat”, statutory law would 
be at the highest level among those within the cognizance of 
the judiciary, provided – of course – that they are adopted 
according to the institutional and procedural norms laid down by 
the constitution. By the way, such a system corresponds 
perfectly with the overall comparative pattern before World 
War II. 
A “Gesetzstaat” may well provide for a good society. In many 
respects, this fits to the Scandinavian states, that are best 
understood as political orders run by ordinary majorities by 
means of statutory law (and money). Norway and its neighbours 
regularly appear on the top of international rankings regarding 
welfare, human rights, freedom of expression and the like. In 
the sense that good societies require good institutions, it is 
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understood that such relative successes are built on the 
relevant constitutions. When it comes to substantive solutions, 
however, the present quality of these societies is not primarily 
due to constitutional norms or court action. Instead, it primarily 
stems from the political culture as manifested through a series 
of majority decisions coined by statutory law. 
The judiciary may certainly provide useful supplements in the 
struggle for ensuring social stability, etc. within a system 
fulfilling basic requirements of the kind often referred to as 
“rettssikkerhet” or the rule of law. However, it is far from being 
the main actor when it comes to creating the substantive 
elements of a good society. 
In this sense, Norway is primarily a “Gesetzstaat” patiently built 
by political will and political cultures. A high level of social trust 
provides one of its prime conditions: We tend to trust each 
other. To an extent that is far from evident in every part of the 
world, we even tend to trust the government. 
However, the preceding observations do not completely 
elucidate the “Rechtsstaat” understood as a system where the 
constitution counts as positive law applicable even by courts. 
All three Scandinavian states now have systems of judicial 
review handled by ordinary courts with one Supreme Court as 
the last instance, as in Denmark and Norway (and Iceland), or 
with two supreme courts, as in Sweden (and Finland). However, 
the Norwegian “Rechtsstaat” has been around for 200 years. 
By contrast, judicial review of legislation was introduced in 
Denmark by jurisprudence a century later (in the early part of 
the 20th century), whereas the Swedish system emanates from 
constitutional amendment in the late 20th century. 
When adopted in 1814, the Constitution actually constituted the 
modern state of Norway as opposed to the state that enjoyed 
its high tides in the Medieval Age. Unlike hundreds of 
constitutions adopted towards the end of the 18th and in the 
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early 19th century, it actually managed to establish a lasting 
state. Its key political institutions – the Supreme Court of 
Norway included – functioned throughout the period of 90 years 
within a kind of personal union with Sweden. In political terms, 
however, the split between the “united” kingdoms was 
considerable and steadily growing. 
The constitution did not mention judicial review of the 
constitutionality of statutory law. The silence did not stay in the 
way, however, for the Supreme Court to behave as if such a 
power existed. In fact, it started to refer to the constitution in a 
way testifying about its status as positive law, a few years only 
after the adoption of the Constitution (around 1820). Some early 
cases even show that the Court actually used the constitution 
as a ground for not applying statutory law against private 
people. We may thus count the Norwegian system of judicial 
review of legislation as Europe’s oldest. 
Historically, the bourgeois constitutions of the 19th century were 
considered as political instruments regulating the relevant state 
apparatus, but not counting as positive law within the 
cognizance of judges. You could not call upon a judge for saying 
that a statute was inapplicable because it was against the 
constitution. 
At the national level at least, the only counter-example before 
Norway was the Marbury v. Madison 1803 decision by the US 
Supreme Court. However, the verdict did not produce any 
significant practical effect before the system started to unfold 
after the Dred Scott case (1855) that, by upholding slavery, 
contributed to paving the way for the U.S. civil war. 
In the meantime, the Norwegian system of judicial review 
emerged. The development in case law is even reflected in 
successive waves of public discussion over the Supreme 
Court’s activity in the field of constitutional law, namely in the 
1840s and 1860s. One of the consequences was the final 
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adoption, in the early 1860s, of a statute by which Parliament 
literally imposed that the members of the Supreme Court 
provide and make available the reasoning underpinning their 
decisions, dissenting opinions included. The purpose was to 
achieve more transparency (as we would now coin it) allowing 
increased possibilities for public control of the judicial institution. 
A few years later (1866), the Supreme Court for the first time 
publicly exposed the existence of judicial review of legislation 
as a part of the Norwegian legal system. In essence, the 
majority of the judges, with the Court president as their principal 
spokesman, declared that insofar as they knew their 
constitutional law and former court practice, the constitutional 
norm should be preferred if both the Constitution and a 
irreconcilable statutory provision applied to the resolution of a 
case. Of course, the invocation of a hierarchy of legal norms 
comes close to the argument used by U.S. Chief Justice 
Marshall in the Marbury case. What both really did, however, 
was primarily to establish the constitution as positive law within 
legal systems where its text provided no support for a similar 
solution. Only when this step is accomplished, the hierarchical 
superiority of the constitution provides a decisive argument. 
The state authorities’ relative passivity in most of the 
19th century heavily conditioned the further development of 
judicial review. In fact, they were far from adopting the kind of 
interventionist approach that most Europeans later have come 
to know. This created few opportunities for the judiciary to deal 
with cases featuring the constitutionality of statutory law. Little 
by little, however, the practice nevertheless developed, thus 
providing solid ground for what was to happen after Norway’s 
unilateral break-up of the personal union with Sweden by a sort 
of coup in 1905 (luckily, the separation was consumed without 
warfare by virtue of a treaty concluded in the autumn of the 
same year). 
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Once the “union question” finally buried, Norwegian politics 
could fully turn to other matters. Questions about regulating old 
and new kinds of economic life (working conditions, the influx of 
foreign capital created by new possibilities of exploiting 
Norway’s extensive hydropower resources, etc.) came to the 
forefront. Of course, this stirred resistance and gave rise to a 
series of cases in which the Supreme Court frequently found 
the application of the relevant pieces of legislation 
unconstitutional. In the next turn, the judgments stirred political 
reactions. The kind of constitutional “activism” deployed in 
these cases contributed to shaping the outcome of a famous 
1918 case where the majority in the Supreme Court concluded 
on the constitutionality of a statutory provision considered as 
particularly important. In its aftermath, the Supreme Court 
gradually showed less appetite for setting legislation aside on 
constitutional grounds. 
In sum, thus, it is possible to see the some 15 years after 1905 
as the Norwegian version of the admittedly more famous “New 
Deal fight” between U.S. President Roosevelt and the Supreme 
Court twenty years later. 
Then came (as you know) the German occupation. After its end 
(1945), Norway entered a high tide of social democratic politics, 
influenced by a wide-reaching determination to reconstruct the 
society. During the first two or three decenniums of this period, 
the Supreme Court never intervened against a statute, not even 
in a few cases where quite a few of us think that an opposite 
conclusion would have be preferable. 
To some extent at least, we may explain this rather reluctant 
attitude by the widespread adherence to an idea of democracy 
understood as majority rule with little leeway for the judiciary to 
call upon the constitution against statutory provisions adopted 
precisely by the majority in Parliament. Instead, the Court 
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sometimes preferred to let contested provisions pass by 
interpreting the constitution reductively. 
In the beginning of the 1970s, however, a slight majority in 
Parliament adopted a statute with the aim of reducing the 
amount of compensation in cases of expropriation of private 
property. The key provision gave rise to a series of court cases 
concerning the question whether applying it would contradict 
the requirement of “full compensation” according to Article 105 
of the constitution. 
In the landmark 1976 judgment, the Supreme Court sitting in 
plenary found itself split in two opposing blocks of almost equal 
size. In essence, the majority said that making use of the 
limitation envisaged by the statutory reform would be 
unconstitutional. However, the contested provision was not 
formally set aside. Instead, the majority said that application 
would not raise constitutional problems insofar as the statute be 
understood and applied in the particular way indicated by the 
Supreme Court. 
The interpretation was hard to defend in light of the wording and 
purpose of the statute, but necessary for defending the 
constitutionality of the statutory provision.  
Recurring to constitution-conform interpretation allowed the 
Court to avoid a kind of open conflict to Parliament. Given the 
history of judicial review after 1918 (and 1945), we may sensibly 
suppose that this was the very purpose of this choice. The 
members of the Supreme Court of Norway were – and remain 
– ordinary judges appointed because they are considered skilful 
in penal law, civil procedure or other branches of “ordinary” law, 
not because they possess any particular knowledge of 
constitutional law or experience from the political arena. This 
particular case appeared in a climate still impregnated by the 
idea of democracy as majority rule. Why not suppose that it was 
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decided by judges that were still in some doubt about their own 
legitimacy to overturn majority decisions by Parliament? 
We nevertheless tend to regard the 1976 decision as the 
starting point for the subsequent development of jurisprudence; 
after all, it ended by turning the key statutory provision down by 
substance. Later on, the climate has gradually but manifestly 
changed in a way making Norwegian judges more self-
confident when exercising judicial review. 
International influences provide one reasonable explanation. 
During many years, judges were generally reluctant to intervene 
against acts of Parliament on behalf of the constitution of 
Norway, even if that constitution is quite flexible in the sense of 
not too difficult to amend. At the same time, they were the more 
and more ready to intervene against national legislation on 
behalf of the European Convention on Human Rights. That 
combination gradually appeared as a paradox, however: If you 
have ideological concerns about calling upon your own 
constitution, how do you defend intervening on behalf of a treaty 
that Norway could not unilaterally change? 
Next, the idea about fundamental rights grew steadily stronger 
even in a Scandinavia that had tended to think that human rights 
protection was more for “the others” than for these inherently 
good societies in North-Western Europe. Sometimes, the 
argument even went that favouring human rights provisions at 
home is not important in itself but worthwhile to establish 
examples for the world. 
Concomitantly with national judges getting more and more 
familiarised with Strasbourg and Luxembourg based judges that 
review domestic legislation with no exorbitant concern for the 
“democratic legitimacy” of their action, such kinds of reasoning 
have pretty much faded away. Together, direct or indirect 
international influences have contributed to raise the self-
confidence of Norwegian judges in general towards politics and 
 15 
to re-familiarise them with the task of reviewing statutory law in 
the light of the constitution. 
Three “big” cases decided in 2010 by the Supreme Court in 
plenary sittings largely contribute to comforting a similar 
impression. All of them built on the general non-retroactivity 
clause in Article 97 of the constitution. Two of them carried on 
statutory provisions adopted with only slight majorities in 
Parliament after harsh debates on their constitutionality, a 
rather uncommon feature in Norway. In the third case, an 
almost unanimous Parliament had adopted the relevant 
statutory provision. 
The three cases have in common, however, explicit 
declarations that Parliament’s thorough consideration of the 
constitutional questions at stake did not suffice for making the 
statute constitutional. Acting under sharp dissent, the relevant 
majorities among the judges went on by saying that the 
contested provisions were clearly in violation of the 
Constitution. They did not, as in 1976, hide behind some form 
of constitution-conform interpretation of the statute. This 
happened even if the relevant cases were of considerable 
financial (the first and the second case) and/or principal 
importance. 
The second case may reasonably be qualified as particular. It 
carried on one of the few parts of the constitution that stays un-
amended since 1814, a provision establishing that what 
remains of the medieval church property (farms, forests, 
money …) should only be used to the benefit of the clergy and 
for education. In the course of the two centuries that had 
passed, however, a regime of state payment for clerics has 
taken over and an extensive system of public schools and 
universities is established. As the raison d’être of the 
constitutional clause had faded away, the government argued 
that parts of the landed property could be sold out to people that 
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had built their houses on rented ground on more beneficial 
conditions than what would otherwise have been the case. In 
the Supreme Court, a small minority accepted this argument 
and voted for a “creative” interpretation according to which the 
clause could no longer be applied. In essence, however, the 
huge majority said that beneficial selling out was against the 
constitution insofar as Parliament itself had not succeeded in 
amending the relevant clause accordingly. 
The third case regarded non-retroactivity in a case about crimes 
of war and against humanity. As the parliament of Norway is 
very much against both, the legislative reform was politically 
uncontroversial. It nevertheless raised legal concern because 
the statutory amendment that introduced the above-mentioned 
qualifications in the penal code had been adopted with the 
intent of making itself applicable even on acts committed before 
the statute entered in force. In practice, the question appeared 
during the trial of a person who had taken part in given atrocities 
in the war in Yugoslavia in 1993 on behalf of the new penal 
clause. The Supreme Court found it clear that applying the 
clause in a similar situation would violate the ban on 
retroactivity. 
In the ensuing debate, no one suggested that the Supreme 
Court acted in defence of war crimes and the like. The fact that 
the principal spokesperson for the majority enjoyed a high 
degree of legitimacy in the field of human rights probably helped 
at least some observers understand that the legal point was not 
about crimes of war, but about defending the constitution at a 
point crucial for the rule of law. A well noted author in the field, 
he had actually served several years as the president of the 
Rwanda tribunal (and later became a member of the Strasbourg 
Court for Norway). 
Before moving further, a few words about the technical 
character of the Norwegian system of judicial review may be 
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useful. A comparison with patterns typical for specialised 
constitutional courts may be of some help: In Norway, the 
judiciary exercises review only ex post, in cases where the 
application of a statute already adopted opens some space for 
argument about the constitutionality of the relevant provisions. 
The review is of a concrete nature with no right to bring disputes 
over the constitutionality of statutory provisions as such to court 
(abstract review). It follows that formally, the verdict has binding 
effect only for the parties to the case, not erga omnes. If 
needed, it is for the law-making authorities to draw the 
necessary conclusions from the verdict by amending or 
abolishing the clause. 
In Norway, however, Parliament will always accept a verdict by 
the Supreme Court and give the meaning of the relevant part of 
the constitution as spelled out by the Court, full effect by 
changing the law in accordance. In that sense, we could say 
that in practice, the judiciary in fact decides on constitutional 
matters with erga omnes effects. 
The three above-mentioned 2010 decisions have contributed to 
confirming the Supreme Court as a much more open political 
actor than before. At the same time, the Court shows a growing 
willingness to cultivate its role as a court of precedent much 
more than as a mere appellate instance. If we understand the 
word as indicating landmark decisions the main legal message 
of which should be followed in subsequent, reasonably similar 
cases, establishing precedents is a common task for supreme 
judicial instances. However, the line sometimes is thin towards 
decisions in which the reasoning provides statements about 
general norms clearly beyond the needs had the Court satisfied 
itself with resolving the particular issue at stake. 
Recurring to lengthy reasons intended to “solve” questions that 
do not really appear in the individual case, the Court inevitably 
enters the field of general law making. However, general law 
 18 
making is a core political function. This qualification holds if the 
“law” developed by the judiciary belongs to the level of ordinary 
statute, i.e. norms that the majority in Parliament is free to 
amend. It becomes even more evident if the judge-made norms 
belong to the field of constitutional law: If taken seriously, such 
norms bind the successive majorities in Parliament in their 
ordinary law-making activity. They can be amended or quashed 
only by amending the constitution. 
Who are these judges that use their status as members of the 
Supreme Court to undertake a more political role? As already 
indicated, ordinary judges in Norway act with powers that 
encompass any possible field of law. There is almost no intra-
court specialisation; for instance, the system does not regard 
certain judges better suited for dealing with administrative law 
cases than other judges. The judiciary is simply organized on 
three different levels (local, appellate and supreme). Within 
each tribunal, the Supreme Court not exempted, the members 
circulate between different types of cases according to time 
priority or other methods with no bearing on the individual case. 
Most cases never pass the two first levels. The Supreme Court 
has managed to bring its caseload down to less than 100 per 
year (of course the workload is higher for the formation charged 
with petitions and certain types of procedural questions). 
Like any other permanent judge, its members are appointed by 
the King in council, an institution that now – politically speaking 
– means the government, whereas the king accepts and signs 
the government’s proposals. The appointments take place upon 
advice from a consultative body dominated by judges and other 
legally trained members, advice that the government follows in 
nearly every case. In contrast to a current pattern during the 
system’s formative period in the 19th century, contemporary 
members of the Supreme Court have no political experience 
whatsoever and intimate knowledge of constitutional law is not 
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required. The last former minister left the Supreme Court some 
40 years ago, and the relevant circles now seem eagerly to 
cultivate the idea that the best Supreme Court judges would be 
those with no marked political opinion or affiliation. 
This brings us back to the question about legitimacy: How may 
we defend a political role for a court staffed with legal-technical 
experts? In a country where most lawyers are happy with 
having other lawyers in the Supreme Court and tend to think 
that law has nothing to do with politics, while the political 
branches tend to leave the judicial system to the lawyers, that 
question is not easily raised. 
To the extent that the Court takes upon itself at least some of 
the functions typical for specialised constitutional courts, like the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht, it is nevertheless 
important to recall that such institutions have been constructed 
with a particular eye on decision-making in constitutional 
matters. For that reason, they are characterised by the 
presence of a strong proportion of members that have been 
openly political appointed. Unlike the all too famous system for 
appointing members of the U.S. Supreme Court, their design 
supposedly ensures a reasonable degree of political balance. 
The German system provides just one prominent example. 
Such systems rest on the idea that if we want courts to intervene 
in politics, the task should be conferred upon people that enjoy 
a minimum of legitimacy from a political point of view. As every 
judge, they should enjoy complete independence, not acting as 
representatives of political parties. At the same time, however, 
their background should ensure a minimum of legitimacy as a 
(in the broad sense) political actor. If the combination might 
appear hard to achieve, experience nevertheless shows that a 
number of leading democracies have succeeded. In the next 
run, this is likely to enhance the court’s latitude for decision-
making in sensitive matters of a politico-constitutional 
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character, compared to the space legitimately enjoyed by 
ordinary judges. 
As already mentioned, the government – i.e. an institution of an 
evidently political character – appoints all permanent members 
of the Norwegian judiciary. The appointment of the president of 
the Supreme Court takes place with no previous advice from 
the lawyer-dominated independent body. By contrast, that body 
will have preselected literally all the other members of the Court. 
Leading members of the Norwegian judiciary nevertheless 
argue that this is insufficient for ensuring judicial independence. 
Instead, an independent body, preferably dominated by judges, 
ought to select the candidates in a way that completely 
determines the outcome. Among other things, they call upon 
resolution 12 (2010) of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the independence of the judiciary. 
Insisting on its own applicability for any kind of judges, including 
judges with constitutional functions, it precisely recommends 
that a body dominated by judges should have the final word in 
matters of appointment. Should a political body, by virtue of the 
constitution, nevertheless possess the last word, its role should 
be a mere formality with no influence whatsoever on whom to 
appoint.  
In essence, thus, the argument is about ensuring a sufficient 
level of independence of the judiciary by closing the 
appointment system even more into the world of jurists. Its 
proponents act at a time when nobody actually argues that the 
independence of the Norwegian judiciary is under threat. 
Instead, they rather tend to point to recent events in Poland or 
Hungary, insisting that we have to set the guards before similar 
things happen at home. 
To the extent that we endorse such claims, we accept that the 
uncontested quest for judicial independence can only be 
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satisfied if the legal community has the last word about who 
should become judge. 
I honestly think that this would not be a good system in general: 
Lawyers are human beings with personal and – more 
importantly – professional opinions about what is “good” or 
“bad” and about the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic 
society. Any system of co-optation tends to produce unhealthy 
sub-cultures badly suited for staffing institutions for authoritative 
decision-making in the society. 
The claim for sheltering the judicial appointment system from 
political influences is further weakened if applied on courts 
and/or judges with important constitutional functions, as the 
Council of Europe would like us to do. In a situation where the 
Supreme Court shows growing appetite for taking upon a 
genuine political function like general law making, we cannot 
leave that argument unanswered. 
We may highlight the point by asking if Germany should take 
the appointments to the Bundesverfassungsgericht away from 
the Bundestag and hand it over to a collegium of (other) jurists 
(or to the Court itself). To me, the very idea appears as 
ridiculous in many ways. It is certainly not by hazard that no 
country with constitutional courts seems to have followed the 
Council of Europe recommendation about isolating the 
appointment of constitutional judges from any kind of political 
influence.  
Is leaving the control over the appointments to lawyers really a 
requirement for the independence of the judiciary? I firmly 
believe that the best answer is negative. Another example may 
enlighten the point: Late Justice Nino Scalia of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, a man that I happened to know, was 
controversial in many ways. As a person, he was a genuine 
conservative, a man I was far from agreeing with at any point. 
The pertinent point, however, is elsewhere: Did his appointment 
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by republican President Reagan and his confirmation by the 
U.S. Senate hamper his independence on the bench? To me, 
the answer seems evident: He was genuinely independent. His 
insistence on certain theoretical positions regarding legal 
interpretation, etc., was certainly not due to any feeling of debt 
to Reagan or gratitude to the political actors that allowed him to 
reach the judicial top. 
A famous quotation from James Madison in the Federalist 
Papers claims that “the permanent tenure by which the 
appointments are held must soon destroy all sense of 
independence of the authority conferring them”, may help 
further clarifying our thoughts. The dictum fits well with the idea 
that if you want to measure a person’s independence, it is far 
less important to know from where you come than where you 
sit.  
Most of us are disposed for doing the best in the position we 
currently occupy. A much more relevant question for those who 
– legitimately – are concerned with ensuring judicial 
independence would rather be which guarantees to provide for 
keeping judicial positions, a reasonable amount of money 
before and after retirement, etc. whatever the relevant judges 
decide. 
Summing up, any judge with the ambition of intervening in the 
genuine political task of general law making should be selected 
with more than the need for legal-technical skills in mind. This 
idea has commanded the construction of numerous 
constitutional courts. The requirement applies even to 
constitutional judges in systems with no specialisation at this 
point. 
The increasingly active approach to constitutional issues 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Norway thus creates a 
particular dilemma: How to combine the need for staffing an 
ordinary court with people charged with solving typical legal 
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intricacies with the kind of political legitimacy that political 
experience, preferably combined with some expertise in 
constitutional law, may provide. Several options are on the 
table. Complete isolation of the selection procedure from any 
kind of political influences is not among them. 
Thank you for your attention. 
